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The interaction between natural resources development and the deployment of social 
resources is vital to understand when designing management institutions. As we look to the 
future management and development of the Nile River Basin Water Resources through the 
Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), it is useful to analyse and draw lessons from the institutional 
design and performance of the now defunct Kagera Basin Organisation (KBO). Established 
with a wide mandate that in a progressive institution would have presented increased 
opportunities for trade-offs among the participants, the KBO lacked the adaptive capacity to 
survive the historical, political and cultural dynamics between the riparians. Its experience 
provides invaluable institutional development lessons regarding political stability; 
commitment; and financial resources mobilisation, but the key lesson learnt is that a 
sustainability level of social resources will be required to identify, define and deploy the 
appropriate development, reform and adaptation mechanisms to transform the NBI into a 
lasting regime of cooperation. 
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Transboundary freshwater systems, like any other shared natural resource, are complex 
ecosystems that transcend the boundaries of national jurisdictions creating 
interdependencies among the riparian actors that utilise them for a variety of purposes. The 
utility that the actors draw from the systems may vary within and across different types of 
consumption, creating asymmetries that can give rise to conflict when the efforts of individual 
actors to achieve their goals interfere with or thwart the efforts of others to pursue their own 
ends. The conflicts have been predicted to take the form of disputes between states over 
property rights on portions of international rivers flowing within the states’ territory; reciprocal 
rights arising from agreements between states, and or obligations deriving from international 
law; and issues of equity in utilising shared water resources (Rubin et al., 1994). In almost all 
cases, acting to coordinate their activities will enhance the benefits of the group; however, 
the fundamental problem is how to establish joint management regimes in which interactive 
decision-making will maximise the utilitarian value of the shared resource (Olson, 1965; 
Schelling, 1978; Hardin, 1982; Young, 1989a, 1997; Bernauer, 1997; Richardson, 1988). 
 
The subject of what determines success or failure in efforts to form regimes has thus drawn 
much attention in recent studies of regime formation, resulting in a lively debate about the 
relative importance of such factors as: 
•  The role of hegemons vis-à-vis the exercise of power (Keohanne, 1984; Snidal, 1985); 
•  The impact of ideas in the context of the significance of epistemic communities (Haas, 
1992); 
•  The dynamics of institutional bargaining (Young, 1989b, 1994); 
•  Integrative potential (Underdal, 1987); and 





Though this debate is in its infancy, it taps into larger debates about the roles of material 
conditions, cognitive factors and interactive decision making as driving social forces of 
human affairs. The answers to when and why such efforts fail or succeed lie in the study of 
the societal processes in which institutional arrangements are designed and implemented 
(Young and Osherenko, 1993b; Bernauer, 2002). 
 
The debate about regime effectiveness is largely centred on the definition of effectiveness, 
although it is sometimes extended to the causal links between institutions and outcomes; 
behavioural pathways and broader consequences. At the heart of the matter is whether it is 
sufficient to regard an international regime as effective or successful when it serves to solve 
or alleviate the problem that led to its creation. While this conception of effectiveness 
intuitively makes sense, its weakness lies in the fact that both the problem and its apparent 
solution can be attributable to other causes and, as such, the danger of ending up with 
spurious correlations is great. This has given rise to approaches exploring such variables as 
goal attainment; implementation and compliance; behavioural change; social learning; the 
initiation of social practices; and evaluative considerations such as the extent to which the 
outcomes produced by institutions are efficient, equitable or sustainable (Young, 1994, 1997; 
Haas et al., 1993). 
 
This paper is aimed at making a contribution to this debate. Focussing on the Nile basin, 
which in the words of Waterbury (1984 : 165) “embodies all challenges that trans-national 
management of fresh water could possibly present”, it illustrates the vitality of Social 
Resources in the establishment of the institutions of functional and progressive regimes. 
Discussing the findings of qualitative enquiry using a juxtaposed theoretical framework of 
Collective Action, International Relations and Societal Processes, this study seeks to inform 
the process of developing a more nuanced approach to the Nile Basin Initiative’s (NBI) 
efforts to negotiate and implement a cooperative framework encompassing the general 
principles, rights, obligations and institutional structures for a regime of cooperation on the 
Nile. This will be done by analysing and drawing lessons from the design and performance of 
the Kagera Basin Organisation. 
 
 
International environmental regime formation 
 
A popular view held in International Relations and Collective Action literature is that the 
eventual performance of a regime is to a significant extent determined by those who define 
its properties and attributes (Jacobson and Weiss, 1995; Young, 1992). As such, institutions 
and regimes fail or succeed largely because they were designed ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. In this 
paper, we argue that the effectiveness of riparian institutional arrangements is broadly 
determined by the capacity of the riparians to mobilise the social resources required to cope 
with, and compensate for environmental scarcity.  
 
The social resources referred to in this context can be defined as the ability of administrative 
organs and managers responsible for natural resources utilisation to deploy the appropriate 
development, reform and adaptation mechanisms for management organisations to function. 
Social resources determine the openness and flexibility of an institution, thus defining its 
progressiveness in the face of emerging problems. They form the required foundation upon 
which policy options and/or strategies can subsequently be built. A sound principle is that for 
the development of a functional institutional framework, a level of social resources 
corresponding to the required level of adaptation to the increasing complexities of natural 
resources development must be achieved and maintained. A failure to meet and sustain this 
level would mean the failure of the institution (see Serageldin and Aster, 1994; Turton, 1999, 





There are two aspects to social resources, namely technical ingenuity and social ingenuity.  
 
Technical ingenuity  
 
Engaging in the process of international environmental regime formation and sustenance 
dictates the creation of a level of administrative, technological and financial capacity to 
manipulate the environment. Before the principal stakeholders can act collectively, they must 
decide on regime objectives and decide how collective action can be undertaken to fulfil the 
objectives of the regime. Technical ingenuity is a vital structural component of this process. 
Its impact is determined by the specificity of the procedural rules laid down during the design 
process; the match between the regime’s objectives and the resources the members are 
prepared to make available; arrangements for the execution of regime functions; and the 
opportunities provided for the regime to interact with its social environment. 
 
Specificity as to exactly how members of a regime should go about achieving the goals of a 
regime is a key determinant of effectiveness which can only be met if there is consensus 
among the actors on the gravity and core of the problem (Chayes and Chayes, 1993; 
Andresen and Wettestad, 1995). Ambiguities in institutional solutions are usually the product 
of an ill-defined scope of a regime’s functions and objectives. As Marty (2001) observes, the 
matter here is one of information and intellectual capacity. The higher the number of issues 
to be dealt with, the broader the functional scope; the more complex the planning and design 
processes will be; and the more information and problem solving capacities will be needed to 
develop detailed solutions. The likelihood that information is not adequate and intellectual 
capacities are insufficient increases with the scope of issues (Haggard and Simmons, 1987). 
As such, parties are more likely to design specific regimes while dealing with a narrow scope 
of issues. 
 
Rangley  et al., (1994: 17) advise that “the objectives should be well focused. A wide 
ambitious mandate, extending across non-water related sectors and into areas outside the 
river basin should be avoided.” This is based on their comparative study of the performance 
of several African river basin organisations from which they found that those with a complex 
set of tasks, like the Niger Basin Authority, Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Kagera 
Basin Organisation, were less successful than the Lesotho Highlands Development 
Authority, whose mandate was restricted to hydroelectric power generation and water 
transfer works. 
 
Similarly, the objectives and capacities should be in line with each other in order for the 
regime to perform well. A limited scale of objectives would reduce the chances that there are 
inconsistencies between the means and ends and thus improve the likelihood of success 
(Andresen and Wettestad, 1995). Again Rangley and his co-authors provide a good example 
in the Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur de Fleuve Senegal (OMVS), which lacked an 
objective program for the integrated development of irrigation with dam construction and thus 
failed to appreciate the crucial need for the expansion of irrigation at a rate that would 
adequately exploit the benefits of the dams. As a result, the dams have been ready for over 
10 years now, but the irrigation and power generating components have failed to take off due 
to serious liquidity problems. 
 
The other key element is the organisation structure of the regime, which dictates how regime 
functions are executed. A regime will be effective if there is a clear assignation of roles 
among the various actors in the performance of the substantive provisions. The clarity of 
these roles will in turn have a direct impact on the transaction costs, as considerable savings 
can be made if redundancy is minimised, coordination efforts kept low and reporting lines 
clear. For this purpose, centralised type structures are usually preferred to decentralised 




worthwhile to distribute functions among a greater number of actors (Young and Moltke, 
1994). 
 
But for the regime to be adaptable to changes in both riparian interests and substantive 
problems, it is necessary to make provisions for a healthy interaction between technical and 
social ingenuity.  
 
Social ingenuity  
 
Conducive structural conditions, though necessary, are not by themselves sufficient to build 
and sustain a regime, neither is it automatic that adverse conditions will prevent the 
formation of a regime. Cooperative outcomes are the product of a process in which various 
strategies are employed to utilise and/or overcome various structural conditions. Regimes 
and their institutions do not appear overnight. It requires a long time to negotiate and 
conclude treaties governing international watercourses and even longer periods for the 
riparians to experiment with various implementation options before establishing a functional 
regime (Bingham et al., 1994). To allow for such experiments and learning processes, 
negotiating bodies and decision-making procedures have to be flexible and open to new 
ideas, otherwise a regime’s performance will be impaired. Also, because river management 
often involves a host of difficult resource problems and possible solutions, it is often useful to 
pursue multiple options that actively involve the principal stakeholders (Marty, 2001). As 
such, regime effectiveness will benefit from mechanisms that provide for coping with relevant 
changes. 
 
Social ingenuity as an aspect of management institutional development is often mentioned in 
passing, but has not been explored in depth as a critical success factor in regime formation. 
It constitutes the social element of regime formation that determines the level of success that 
can be achieved when creating an enabling environment for: 
•  Inspiring commitment to the institutional arrangements among stakeholders; 
•  The regime to generate strategies or policy options that are perceived as being both 
reasonable and legitimate by the stakeholders; and 
•  The institutional organs to develop adaptive mechanisms with which to ensure that the 
regime is not held hostage by ‘high-politics’, especially if the latter is characterised by 
tense relations between riparians. 
 
It is often the case that the various actors harbour divergent interests. Under these 
conditions, the challenge for any group is to devise the means by which these interests are 
translated into some measure of group preferences. A necessary but insufficient condition for 
cooperation to emerge through agreement between rational actors is the mutual perception 
of some integrative potential, i.e. the possibility of achieving some cooperative solution(s) 
preferred to the best available non-cooperative outcome by at least one actor and perceived 
as worse by none of the prospective partners (Underdal, 1987). Perceptions are therefore 
very important, especially among sovereign states whose interests are dynamic. It is for the 
purpose of understanding these perceptions and, where appropriate, changing them or 
instituting reforms to adapt to them that social ingenuity is an indispensable element of 
regime formation.  
 
This assertion is founded on the argument that regime formation is also influenced by social 
behaviour through informal institutions. While it may seem that formal rules are created with 
the intention of guiding and/or changing behaviour and attitudes among actors, public opinion 
is started and consolidated at the informal level before there is an alteration in the rules. In 
any case, formal rules are easier to enforce if they have the support of customs and their 




institutions are the consensus of beliefs and behaviour shared in society, and a change in 
one causes a change in the other.  
 
Incorporating these emerging compulsive new factors of intersubjectivist and process 
variables of routines, intentions and motives introduces a staggering degree of complexity 
into regime formation that underlines the significance of the role of social resources. In its 
ideal form, this concept provides both a guiding principle and a framework for designing 
progressive institutional arrangements by which the behaviour of actors participating in 
complex social practices is influenced through de-facto engagement and discourse rather 
than conscious decisions about compliance with prescriptive rules (Asmal, 1998; Arts, 2000; 
Alheritiere, 1985; Caldwell, 1988; Litfin, 1994; Wendt, 1994; North, 1990). 
 
 
The case of the Nile Equatorial Lakes Sub-basin 
 
The launch in 1999 of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was a major achievement in international 
efforts to unite all riparian countries in the pursuit of sustainable development and 
management of the Nile waters. The NBI’s goal is set out as “to achieve sustainable socio-
economic development through the equitable utilisation of, and benefit from the common Nile 
Basin water resources.” (NBI and World Bank, 2001: 2). This is to be achieved through a two 
tier Strategic Action Programme comprising the Shared Vision Programme (SVP), of 
technical assistance and capacity building projects to be implemented basin-wide as a 
means of creating an enabling environment for cooperative development, and the Subsidiary 
Action Programme (SAP), comprising joint investment projects. Two groupings for the SAP 
have formed, one within the Eastern Nile (ENSAP) including Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, 
while the other covers the Nile Equatorial Lakes Region (NELSAP) with the six countries in 
the southern portion of the basin, namely Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, as well as Sudan and Egypt. A Coordination Unit 
(NEL-CU) has been established for NELSAP with a mandate to build national institutional 
capacity for sub-basin cooperation in the implementation of the activities of NELSAP. Key 
among these activities is the creation of an enabling environment for the development of a 
joint strategy for the water allocation negotiations, and a framework for a permanent 
institution to manage the water resources in the Kagera River Basin (NEL-COM, 2001). 
 
This transition mechanism of cooperation marks a bold step towards overcoming the 
complex mosaic of river management challenges that date back to the colonial period when 
Great Britain established a regime favouring Egyptian uses of the Nile. These arrangements 
were then reinforced by the politics of the Cold War and culminated in the 1959 Agreement 
for the Full Utilisation of the Nile Waters, in which the river’s entire discharge was 
appropriated between only two of the now ten riparian states. Since then, inter-riparian 
relations regarding property rights on the portions of the river flowing within the territory of the 
excluded states have been tense at best, and have degenerated to threats of war on at least 
one occasion. Within the Nile Equatorial Lakes Sub-basin, the Cold War left a legacy of civil 
wars that were localised manifestations of former superpower rivalries. It is the tensions 
emanating from these non-water related disputes that pose the greatest challenge to the NBI 
objectives of using economic integration and joint action between the riparian countries to 
achieve sustainable socio-economic development and eradicate poverty.  
 
The purpose of this study is not to highlight the practical difficulties of negotiating equitable 
use formulae or the dim and hazy prospect of a functional cooperative regime. Instead, the 
aim is to explore possibilities for redefining the parameters of the stakeholders in ways that, 
given the basin’s rich history of non-cooperation, should make the NBI not just another 
exercise in futility. Narrowing the scope to the catchment area of the Lake Victoria and the 
Kagera River, we evaluate the performance of the now defunct Kagera Basin Organisation 




Subsidiary Action Programme. In search of lessons on what can be done differently to build a 
lasting regime, we postulate the extent to which this performance can be attributed to social 
resources or their lack. 
 
The Kagera Basin Organisation 
 
The Kagera Basin Organisation (KBO) was established in 1977 as a result of diplomatic 
initiatives to operationalise the concept of regional and basin-wide planning in the Kagera 
Basin. The first step was taken in 1969, when a United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) fact finding mission, in consultation with the governments of Burundi, Rwanda, 
Tanzania and Uganda, recommended that a technical committee be established to 
coordinate orderly regional planning. The committee was established between Burundi, 
Rwanda and Tanzania, Uganda preferring to participate in an observer role. In 1970, the 
committee submitted a successful funding proposal to the UNDP for the Kagera Basin 
Development studies, which were launched in 1971. The first phase, which lasted up to 
1973, consisted largely of data collection and analysis, with emphasis on tourism; 
hydropower potential; fisheries; and institutional arrangements. This data, together with the 
national priorities of the three states, then formed the basis for the preparation of the 
Indicative Basin Plan that was submitted in 1976 at the end of Phase II. The committee also 
commissioned a separate study on harnessing hydroelectric power at Rusomo Falls on the 
Kagera, and the environmental and commercial implications of such a development. From 
the initial findings of these studies, it was clear that all the riparian states shared common 
problems in most fields of economic and social development; and that a medium was 
required through which the basin’s development potential could be realised by jointly 
coordinating the planning and exploitation of the sub-region’s resources. So it was that on 
August 24, 1977 the Agreement establishing the Organisation for the Development and 
Management of the Kagera River Basin, commonly known as the KBO, was signed between 
Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania at Rusomo. Uganda acceded to it in 1981.  
 
At its inception it was envisaged that the KBO would deal, and I quote Article IV of the 
Treaty, with “all questions relevant to the activities to be carried out in the Kagera Basin” 
(FAO, 1997: 37). After two donor support mobilisation conferences, in Paris in 1979 and 
Geneva in 1982, the organisation’s governing organs finally articulated this objective into the 
conduct of studies for the implementation of fourteen priority projects in four key sectors, 
namely Transport and Communications, Energy, Agriculture, and Information and Training. 
By 1992, project documents and feasibility study reports had been prepared for most of the 
projects. However, there was limited success in raising funds for their implementation. At the 
time of its dissolution, this list of projects had further been prioritised into four: the Rusomo 
Falls Hydroelectric Power Project; Phase II of the Tsetsefly and Trypanosomiasis Control 
Project; the Rehabilitation of the Miramira Hill-Ntungamo-Ishaka road; and the Rehabilitation 
of the Mutukula-Bukoba-Biharamulo-Lusahanga road. The presentation to the donors of 
funding proposals for these projects was scheduled for June 1995, but had to be called off 
following the April to July 1994 war in Rwanda. 
 
The KBO’s Performance 
 
Though institutions are much broader than mere organisations, a review of the factors that 
influence institutions is necessary for a fair assessment of the KBO’s performance.   
Institutional literature lists some of these factors as historical precedents, constitutional 
provisions, political arrangements, demographic conditions, resources endowment and 
economic development. Thus, the process of institutional design and the resulting 
frameworks, policy and administrative arrangements are invariably a reflection of the 
particular blend of these factors, which in turn defines the goals and objectives of any 





For the KBO, the overriding need was to disenclave its landlocked hinterland and, in the 
process, provide opportunities to exploit the sub-region’s hitherto untapped natural 
resources. Its original mandate extended way beyond the Kagera river catchment and 
reflected a development agenda expected more of a regional development agency than a 
River Basin Organisation (RBO). None of its wide array of projects was in line with such core 
functions of a RBO as hydrological studies, pollution control, environmental protection, or 
ecological conservation. In this context, the overall performance of the KBO is relatively more 
difficult to assess, for neither the criteria for evaluating a development agency nor those for 
an RBO seem appropriate. And since the KBO’s Indicative Basin Plan read more like a 
specific project development list than a development strategy, its performance can be 
evaluated in terms of the extent to which the Priority Action Programme
1 (PAP) was 
implemented. Its achievements on this front included the following:-  
 
(a)  The KBO regional telecommunications project: This was the organisation’s main 
achievement. With funds from the African Development Bank, interconnection between the 
four member states’ capitals and a number of key towns was made possible using high 
quality terrestrial microwave links and modern switching equipment. This eliminated the need 
to route calls through Europe, and not only reduced the cost of making calls within East 
Africa but also improved the quality of connection. Rwanda and Burundi gained direct access 
to the East African Telecommunications network, with the possibility of tapping into the main 
PANAFTEL network for Eastern and Central Africa, while Uganda had the opportunity of 
being connected to Southern Africa. This was a major step towards improving trade and 
commerce with the outside world. However, as one of four projects that were intended to 
meet the primary goal of opening up the landlocked interior, this was a modest achievement. 
The railways project, in which two branch lines would connect Rwanda and Burundi to the 
East African Community (EAC) grid through the port of Bukoba; the roads rehabilitation 
programme and the navigability of the Kagera never got beyond the feasibility study stage.  
 
(b)  The KBO regional centre for economic documentation: The centre was set up in 
Kigali as part of the Human Resources Development project portfolio. Funded by the UNDP, 
it boasted
2 a collection of over 8,000 items that included reference books, periodicals and 
project study reports and documents, and a modern Statistical Data Bank and Information 
Service. It was to serve the purpose of acquiring, storing and disseminating information to 
the KBO Secretariat, specialists and consultants participating in the organisation’s activities 
and other relevant bodies in the member States. The Kagera Polytechnic Institute, which was 
the other project in this portfolio, was shelved in part due to its intended beneficiaries 
preferring to study abroad. 
 
(c)  The tsetsefly and trypanosomiasis control project: This was one of six projects under 
the Agriculture Sector. Under this project, the Economic Commission for Africa’s International 
Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology ECA/ICIPE conducted vector distribution surveys 
and trials on various control methodologies in the heavily infested (former) Akagera Park 
region. It was on this basis that the full-scale control programme was to be launched. This, 
however, was not implemented due to funding constraints.  
 
The Rusomo Hydroelectric project, which at the organisation’s inception was conceived as 
the key to industrial activity in the basin areas of Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania ended up 
as the subject of several inconclusive studies. Thus, in terms of implementing the Priority 
Action Programme, the KBO clearly under-performed. Indeed, viewed in financial terms, only 
                                                  
1 A list of 14 projects in the four key sectors of Transport and Communications, Energy, Agriculture, and 
Information and Training, which was arrived at after the donor community advised that the Indicative 
Basin Plan was too incomplete for funding consideration.  





3 of the budgeted US $3 billion capital cost of the PAP was mobilised. This 
represents a huge investment gap, and a failure to capture the interest of potential funding 
agencies. Also, considering that member contributions averaged about 30% of funding 
requirements, it could be that its architects overestimated the members’ financial capacity to 
meet regime costs or that the riparian states lacked faith in the organisation.  
 
Why the KBO underperformed 
 
The fact that efforts to establish the KBO followed immediately in the wake of the decline of 
the East African Community (EAC), and were championed by Tanzania was not a 
coincidence. In the lead-up to the collapse of the EAC, Uganda and Tanzania had long 
complained of inequalities in the benefits derived from the Union, notably:- 
•  Due to disparate levels of development, trade within the de facto common market was 
heavily in favour of Kenya, and because most industries in the Union had their 
headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya also received a lion’s share of the customs and other 
revenues; 
•  Nairobi was the seat of most of the Commission’s establishments, which did not augur 
well with Uganda and Tanzania; and  
•  Tanzania justifiably complained of not being served well by the transport system under 
the Union, specifically the railway lines which were too short, and only the light aircraft of 
the East African Airlines flew to Dar es salaam. 
 
Kenya’s refusal to ratify the 1964 Kampala Agreement
4, the central tenet of which was the 
relocation of certain industries away from Kenya, marked the beginning of the collapse of the 
EAC. On realising this, Tanzania sought another avenue for the achievement of its long-term 
goal of attaining socio-economic development through regional integration.  
 
Also recall that this was around the time when the government of Tanzania had just issued 
what has come to be known as the Nyerere Doctrine on State Succession to Treaties, 
outlining the policy of Tanzania on the use of the waters of Lake Victoria and its catchment 
area, which had been adopted by the governments of Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi. 
Building on these sentiments, and presenting the EAC’s replacement as an entity that would 
deal with Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda’s handicap of being landlocked by facilitating their 
trade and transport with the outside world, Tanzania had no difficulties enlisting the support 
of the other Kagera riparians in the formation of the KBO. The overriding goal was to fill the 
void left by the collapse of the EAC. The KBO was modelled on the functions of the EAC, a 
regional trading block, which explains why the KBO’s mandate was more in line with that of a 
development agency than of a river basin organisation. 
 
Thus established, and following donor feedback on the articulation of objectives, a healthy 
interaction of social and technical ingenuity was required to restructure the organisation in 
ways that would enhance donor interest. What follows is an account of the key historical, 
political and cultural factors that clearly illustrate social resources as the lacking interceding 
variable in this re-orientation process.  
 
The Amin – Nyerere clash of personalities 
What has been said of friendships among countries in Africa being ultimately dependent on 
the friendships, at a personal level, of their leaders came to pass in this incident when 
General Idi Amin Dada overthrew Uganda’s President Apollo Milton Obote, a personal friend 
of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. President Nyerere refused to accept Amin’s 
                                                  
3 Excluding the cost of constructing the Headquarters and regional offices buildings. 
4 Based on the Jeremy Raisman Commission’s recommendations for correcting trade imbalances in East 




leadership, and despite Uganda and Tanzania sharing grievances with regard to the direction 
the EAC was taking, Nyerere refused to recognise Amin’s nominated delegates to the EAC. 
Instead, he accused Amin of withdrawing the recognised delegates (nominated by Obote) 
without prior consultation. He made no secret of his wish to have no dealings with President 
Amin and, thus, Obote’s fall arguably dealt the final blow to the EAC. 
 
But for the customary law requirement that the implementation of projects on shared 
watercourses be consented to by all riparians, President Nyerere would have preferred to 
deal with only Rwanda and Burundi. President Amin for his part opted to restrict Uganda’s 
involvement in the KBO to that of observation thereby undermining the utility of the 
organisation, since studies could only be carried out in three of the four riparian countries. 
When Uganda acceded to the treaty, the organisation’s administrative arrangements had to 
be restructured to accommodate the Ugandan delegation, something that did nothing to 
improve the coordination of activities. 
 
Ethnic tension 
The Hutu–Tutsi friction, carried over from the Belgian colonial microcosm, further 
compounded the organisation’s lack of internal cohesion. Before implementing their 
colonisation policy of ‘Les reformes voison’, the Belgians took time to study the Chiefly 
hierarchy in the kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi, and the system of indirect administration 
bequeathed by the Germans. They concluded that the Tutsi Chiefs were more active, 
intelligent, progressive and thus best suited to work with the government (Prunier, 1995). 
This eventually led to a situation of almost total dominance of the administrative functions of 
Rwanda-Urundi by the Tutsis. The words Tutsi, which originally described the status of an 
individual rich in cattle, became a term referring to the elite group; and the word Hutu, 
meaning subordinate or follower of a more powerful person, came to refer to the mass of 
ordinary people (de Forges, 1999). With pressure from the United Nations (UN), which 
supervised the administration of Rwanda-Urundi under the trusteeship system, the Belgians 
initiated changes to increase Hutu participation in public life toward the end of their rule. This 
culminated in the Hutu Revolution in the Republic of Rwanda, but the Tutsi-dominated 
government ruthlessly put down similar efforts in Burundi. 
 
The Tutsi – Hutu friction between two of the founder members of the KBO spilt over to the 
running of the organisation, resulting in such counterproductive measures as different 
delegations objecting to projects that seemed to be more beneficial to the politically dominant 
group in either country; and where such objections were overcome there were incidents of 
individual states failing to send agreed delegations to donor countries and institutions to 
mobilise resources to implement the projects.  
 
The Cold War and Franco – Anglo competition 
Also set in the region’s colonial history are the effects of Franco-Anglo competition and Cold 
War politics on the performance of the KBO. Within the donor community, Tanzania’s leading 
role in the KBO’s establishment no doubt played on French and Belgian fears of an Anglo-
Saxon erosion of their position on the continent – a fear that was not helped by the 
appointment of the first two Executive Secretaries from Tanzania (1978-1982) and Uganda 
(1983-1987), despite the fact that Uganda only acceded to the treaty in 1981. The rest of the 
donor community did not warm up to the organisation, in part due to Tanzania’s leaning 
towards the Communist camp in Cold War politics. The result was that the organisation could 
not raise the funds to implement its rather ambitious project portfolio.  
 
Among the riparian states, Franco – Anglo competition was a key factor in the lack of internal 
cohesion, which in turn had an impact on the organisation’s overall performance. Tiharuhondi 
(2001) cites the highest tension as having been witnessed in the period 1978-1982 ,when 
two of the organisation’s departmental directors “concentrated on highlighting the political 




Civil wars and non water-related disputes among riparian states 
Political differences and mistrust between member states were further exacerbated by the 
1990 Rwandese Patriotic Front’s (RPF) invasion of Rwanda from Uganda. Since the majority 
of the invading forces had been members of Uganda’s National Resistance Army (NRA), 
President Juvenial Habyarimana accused his Ugandan counterpart of having aided the 
invasion, and severed relations between them.  
 
With three (Rwanda – Burundi and Rwanda – Uganda) of the four member states harbouring 
deep suspicion of each other, the impact on the organisation’s activities was such that timely 
decisions could not be taken on many KBO activities. The invasion also marked the start of 
the civil war in Rwanda that paved the way for the 1994 genocide. Together with the internal 
conflicts in Burundi, this meant that it was impossible to continue with project studies and 
implementation work in about 55% of the KBO’s territorial jurisdiction. 
 
Lack of commitment 
Though the treaty did not provide for the assembly of the Heads of State, who comprised the 
Summit – which was one of the organisation’s three institutional organs, the others being the 
Council of Ministers and the Intergovernmental Commission of Experts – it provided for 
annual meetings (Okidi, 1994). But such was the lack of commitment to the organisation that 
prior to its dissolution in 2004, the Summit last met in 1993 while the Council of Ministers 
only met twice in the same period. And even when the meetings took place, they ended up 
being more like talking shops, for none of the resolutions taken were ever effected.  
 
 
Lessons learnt and reflected in the Nile Basin Initiative 
 
The formal dissolution of the KBO on 7 July 2004 followed a decision taken at the January 
2000 Extra-ordinary KBO Council of Ministers meeting that KBO activities be transferred to 
the EAC when it is reactivated, and Rwanda and Burundi are admitted as members. Since 
then the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has taken particular interest in two of the projects in the 
KBO’s portfolio – the Rusomo Hydroelectric power project, and the navigability of the Kagera 
River – and agreement has been reached for them to be implemented under the Nile 
Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Programme (NELSAP). 
 
Evidently, there are parallels between the KBO and the NBI and a review of the KBO’s 
performance would certainly inform the process of developing a sustainable framework for 
cooperation, whether in the Lake Victoria basin or the Nile Basin as a whole. It makes place 
for the following key lessons. 
 
Political stability and support 
It is conventional wisdom regarding cooperation on shared watercourses that results can 
best be achieved within a climate of trust, the prerequisites of which are the internal political 
stability of each riparian state and demonstration of political commitment to shared river 
basin issues. An analysis of the Shared Vision Programme (SVP) reveals that the objectives 
of the NBI were indeed informed by this wisdom. What is of concern is the prevalence of the 
development discourse that seems to suggest that economic development is the necessary 
and sufficient solution to the riparians’ problems.  
 
True, the Nile Equatorial Lakes sub-basin is home to three of the world’s poorest nations and 
so it would seem logical that jointly implementing investment projects utilising the sub-basin 
waters will open up these countries to each other’s ideas, goods, services and labour, thus 
speeding up the process of poverty reduction. But despite publicly extolling the virtues of 
cooperation, not much has changed in sub-basin political dynamics from what existed at the 
formation of the KBO. The tensions and mistrust borne of Colonial and later, Cold War 




assertiveness, especially among the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda. The ‘New Leadership’
5 that 
in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s provided optimism for the achievement of peace and the 
improvement of policy environments in the sub-basin seem to have been sucked into the 
regional political quagmire and instead harbour deep seated suspicions of each other based 
on political, ideological and sometimes personal differences. In fact the prevailing intra and 
inter state mistrust makes cross-border investment highly risky, which in turn makes 
economic development suspect as a key strategy for achieving the desired cooperation and 
regional integration. Moreover, the water resources of the Kagera catchment do not feature 
in any of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes
6 of its riparians. How, then, can the 
potential economic benefits from the proposed projects involving these resources be used to 
push the development of any cooperative framework among the riparians to the top of their 
national priorities? 
 
Financial resource mobilisation 
A clear lesson from the KBO experience is that a sound financial position is imperative for 
the establishment of an effective regime. The ability to meet the costs related to regime 
formation; sustenance and financing of investments certainly requires commitment and 
innovative financing arrangements by governments, donors and the benefiting community. In 
this regard, an International Consortium for Cooperation on the Nile (ICCON) was 
established to support the NBI’s Strategic Action Programme. It brings together the Nile 
riparian states; donor agencies; credit institutions; private investors and civil society, 
professional and non-governmental organisations. Because the NBI is a transitional 
cooperative institution, this funding mechanism is operated as a World-Bank managed Trust 
Fund, the Nile Basin Trust Fund, that will eventually be transferred to a Nile Basin Institution 
with appropriate legal status and capacity (NBI and World Bank, 2001). 
 
Development strategy 
One of the key criticisms levelled at the KBO by Rangley et al., (1994), is its focus on project-
based planning without developing a strategy for identifying and evaluating investment 
opportunities. The result was a waste of time and resources studying projects that had little 
chance of being implemented. This has been addressed through a four-step process of 
establishing the NELSAP, consisting of in-country analysis and project identification; inter-
country project conceptualisation; preparation of joint Project Identification Documents for 
submission at ICCON meetings; and the development of project proposals and 
implementation. Through this process, projects are streamlined and only those deemed to be 
sustainable, achievable and of significant shared benefits get to be presented at ICCON 
meetings, which are currently scheduled to take place every two to three years (NBI and 
World Bank, 2001). 
 
Ownership and commitment 
No strategy would be useful in the absence of ownership by those who would later put it to 
use. External consultants may be of assistance, but local decision-makers and communities 
must have a sense of ownership or see a role for themselves. The SVP anticipates broad-
based participation that also includes representatives of the general public, private sector 
associations and NGOs. It is envisaged that this will promote effective dissemination of 
information to a wide audience, which will in turn provide a means of enhancing stakeholder 
confidence in the NBI. Within this broad objective, a public information campaign will 
encourage greater basin-wide political engagement for cooperation, promote a healthy 
                                                  
5 Referring to the governments that replaced the dictatorships in the region. 
6 These are national development plans, covering such areas of development as poverty reduction, health 
and education, industry, agriculture and macroeconomics, which governments in low-income countries 
are required to draw up in consultation with civil society in order to receive debt reduction under the 





discourse on regional development, and raise public awareness and understanding of the 
NBI process (NBI, 2001).  
 
In pursuing the principle of subsidiarity, the riparians will also be able to take full advantage 
of the opportunities in the different geographical areas to address the unique nature of the 
needs in each sub-basin. This may well be the key to sustained riparian commitment. 
 
A shift from water sharing to benefit sharing 
Realising the practical difficulties of negotiating equitable water sharing formulae against a 
rich history of conflict and controversy over the utilisation of the Nile waters, the riparians 
took a historic step towards a functional regime of cooperation by diffusing focus from the 
symbolic but inconclusive issues of water redistribution to a redefinition of the problem as 
one of basin-wide development, with emphasis on the benefits of regional cooperation. The 
cooperative dialogue is aimed at facilitating a move from a primarily country focus towards 
wider needs and interests, based upon which opportunities for collaboration can be better 
identified. In due course, an enabling environment for the development of a joint strategy for 
water allocation negotiations will be created, and the process will be made easier by a wider 





Social resources mobilisation and natural resources development, as represented by social 
and technical ingenuity, are two completely separate but deeply interrelated spheres of 
management institutional development that cannot be developed in isolation from one 
another, and the interaction between them is vital to understand when designing 
management institutions. Yet in the case of the KBO, all the activities leading up to the 
Rusomo Treaty focussed entirely on the technical aspects of the regime, with no attempt 
whatsoever to explore the social resources that would legitimise the regime for its intended 
actions and thus garner member commitment and, more importantly, eliminate the donor 
scepticism that undermined its existence. In developing countries, exogenous support from 
such actors as aid donors, specialised agencies and financial institutions plays a central role 
in institutional development. Similarly for the KBO, the UNDP and the Kingdom of Belgium 
played such a central role in the activities to justify the KBO’s formation and its design that 
even the Rusomo treaty was based on a draft prepared by two UNDP consultants
7. Under 
such circumstances, the social component was required to develop a mechanism to adapt 
these arrangements to the historical, cultural and political conditions that existed among the 
riparians. It goes without saying that the negotiating dynamics leading to successful 
establishment of water management accords vary from basin to basin, and as such there is 
no global applicability (Mitchell, 1990; Cano, 1986; Marty, 2001), which is why there was a 
need for feedback between the technical and social components of the KBO’s establishment. 
 
This oversight was the KBO’s undoing. In failing to deploy the appropriate social resources to 
engender a culture that would enable the riparian states to sacrifice some constituency 
interests and focus on the goal of alleviating poverty, they failed to achieve internal cohesion 
and commitment. In so doing, they failed to assure aid donors and credit institutions, on 
whose technical and financial support the organisation was to rely, of the successful 
implementation of the joint development projects. 
 
The need for a lasting regime of cooperation, whether in the Lake Victoria basin or the Nile 
as a whole, cannot be overemphasised. Yet the region’s problematic history of non-
cooperation and the prevailing political dynamics present a tremendous challenge to this 
                                                  





goal. The NBI’s Shared Vision Programme represents a major attempt at overcoming this 
challenge and, if genuinely implemented, may act as the catalyst for basin-wide cooperation; 
building trust; and ensuring a comprehensive approach to the achievement of sustainable 
basin-wide economic development. But while this programme lists sufficient conditions for 
overcoming the current problems, a sustainability level of social resources in the legal and 
institutional dialogue will be required to identify, define and deploy the appropriate 
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